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Is Price-Fixing Per Se Reasonable?
A Discussion
ARvAL MoPIus
Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common
law itself is nothing else but reason. - Coke.
It has been said that agreements between competitors which
fix prices' or which substantially affect the impartial functioning
of the price fashioning mechanism 2 are illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 This doctrine which possibly can be
inferred from a literal interpretation of the written words of the
Sherman Act,4 has been applied to arrangements seeking to limit
production and apportion markets, 5 as well as to agreements
which deny market access to competitors. 6 These arrangements
have been condemned as being illegal per se, i.e., not requiring
a reasonable balancing of the economic factors of the case and
their possible economic effects.
On the other hand, an agreement which fixes prices among
competitors may, under certain circumstances, be legal. The
circumstances in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States7 culminated in the judgment that enforcement of the Board's rule prohibiting purchases after business hours had no appreciable effect
on general market prices, nor volume of trade. In the same vein
I United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 892 (1927). Including
maximum price fixing (Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram and Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211 (1951) as well as minimum price-fixing (Mandeville Island Farms v. AmeriSugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
can Crystal
2
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
3
See Peppin, "Price-Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Antitrust Law",
28 Cal. L. Rev. 297, 667 (1940); Jaffs and Tobriner, "Legality of Price Fixing
Agreements" 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1164 (1932); Comment 'Refusals to Sell and
Public Control of Competition", 58 Yale L. J. 1121 (1949); Comment, 19 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 837 (1952).
4 See Carlston, Law and Structures of Social Action (1956) pp. 200-209.
5Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
GFashion Originators Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941); International
Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 832 U.S. 302 (1947).
7246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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is Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States8 where the Court failed
to find an anti-competitive effect on the general market resulting from an agreement among regional bituminous coal operators to sell their product through a common sales agency. In
these cases the Supreme Court's approach to price fixing arrangements was other than per se. It applied another doctrine-the
rule of reason-which is wholly extraneous to the written word
of the Sherman Act. 9 In these latter cases, the Court made an
economic and factual inquiry, inter alia, (1) whether the defendants had enough market power to affect market prices; (2)
whether the defendants had actually exercised or had been intending to exercise that power.
More specifically and more pointedly, Mr. Justice Jackson
has said that "it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors
from any substantial market." 10 Yet, many exclusive territorial
dealership agreements which by their very nature must deny
market access to competitors, may be quite legal.11 And when
commenting on the Yellow Cab case, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 12 declared that nothing in
Yellow Cab "supports the theory that all exclusive dealing arrangements are illegal per se."
These cases exasperate the attorney questing for a thread of
certainty and a basis for prediction. He must determine whether
all cases embodying an application of the rule of reason should
be distinguished and divorced from those other antitrust cases
where there are allegations that the agreements are per se illegal.
Can these cases rationally be separated, or must resort to a rule of
reason be relied upon to decide both? If so, what differences lie
between the two types of cases, if, indeed, there be any differences-and what is the proper standard used to define the differences? How are the courts able to tell whether the restraint
is per se a restriction on competitive circumstances and yet avoid
8288 U.S. 344 (1933); See also, Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S.
553 (1936) and Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588

(1925).
9See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); and
Justice Harlan's dissent in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221

U.S. 1 (1911).
10 See International Salt Co. Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 302 (1947).
31 See United States v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
12 344 U.S. 495, 523 (1948).
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the vexations and difficulties incumbent in a reasonable examination of economic facts? Yet, before invoking the per se doctrine
the courts must discharge their obligations and find that the
alleged restraint is undoubtedly an undue limitation on competition. But isn't it exactly this inquiry which is the core of the
rule of reason and which is forsaken by the per se doctrine? How
delimit the scope of that doctrine, to learn its ambit and thereby
come to understand what amounts to a per se violation of the
Sherman Act? These are hard questions, and history may or may
not help in their solutions.
The genesis of the rule of reason as well as that of the per se
approach was spawned in that perplexing mind of Chief Justice
White. It is significant that throughout the annals of antitrust
literature no judge has sought to do over what White did in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.13 That fertile architectural triumph of 1911, though somewhat remodelled recently,
has never been razed and still remains as the outstanding pillar
supporting present judicial construction of the Sherman Act.
In Standard Oil, Justice White concerned himself with two
primary matters. He sought to alleviate and yet to preserve the
previously misdirected impetus given the Sherman Act by Justice
Peckham, the Court's first antitrust expert.14 To accomplish his
mission, White advocated reasonableness as the proper overriding
guide for a judicial approach and developed the now famous
rule of reason. Prior to White's ascendancy, Peckham, a literalist
in these matters, had read the Sherman Act to include and prohibit every contract, combination or conspiracy, as well as to
proscribe every person who monopolizes, attempts or conspires to
monopolize. 15 This approach, of course, precluded setting "sail
on a sea of doubt" and restricted the Sherman Act solely to the
lawyer's realm of precedential, analogous reasoning incorporat13221 U.S. 1 (1911); The Attorney General's National Committee to Study

the Antitrust Laws believes this case marks
proach-See Report .of the Attorney General's
For comments on this committee's work and
Select Committee on Small Business (1956)
articles.

the beginning of the modem apNational Committee (1955) p. 5.
its composition see, Report of the
as well as numerous law review

14peckham wrote five of the first six opinions: United States v. Trans-

Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898);
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
15 ibid.
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ing its essentials from illusions of stare decises. Aristotelian
syllogistics would have been triumphant had Justice Peckham's
view prevailed, and an economic approach to the monopoly problem-whether embodying new reason1 6 or old 17 could never have
arisen. Holmes foresaw manifest difficulties inherent in Peckham's views and denied them; for if they were followed "all
A single railroad down a narrow valley
business must cease ....
or through a mountain gorge monopolizes all the railroad transportation through that valley gorge."' 8 Even Peckham was forced
to retreat and did not include all contracts of collaterial restraint
which were designed to prevent a business vendor from competing with his vendee. These contracts, well recognized at the common law, were lawful, and Peckham held that the Sherman Act
applied "only to those contracts whose direct and immediate
.".9 Peckham's direct-indirect
effect is a restraint on commerce
distinction opened the door for White, and he lost no opportunity
to interpose the rule of reason. But choosing not to overrule
Peckham's Rate Bureau opinions, White sought to get around and,
at the same time, to preserve them. To do this he introduced a
strained rationale:
That . . . the rulings in the case relied upon, (Trans-

Missouri and Joint Traffic) when rightly appreciated,
were therefore this, and nothing more: That as considering the contracts and agreements, their necessary effect,
and the character of the parties by whom they were made,
they were clearly restraints of trade within purview of the
statute, they could not be taken out of that category by
indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency or
nonexpediency of having made the contracts or the wisdom or want of wisdom of the statute which prohibited
their being made. That is to say, the cases but decided
that the nature and character of the contracts, creating as
they did, a conclusive presumption which brought them
within the statute, such result was not to be disregarded
by the substitution of a judicial appreciation of what the
16
See Adams, "Rule of Reason: Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly", 63 Yale L. J. 848 (1954); Stocking, "Rule of Reason, Workable Competition and the Legality of Trade Association Activities", 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
527 (1954).
1 Griffin, An Economic Approach to Antitrust Problems (1951); Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation", 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1139 (1952).
IsNorthern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 407 (1904).
19 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n. 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898).
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law ought to be for the plain judicial duty of enforcing
the law as it was made 20 (Emphasis supplied.)
White's basic position is fundamentally inconsistent. On the
one hand, he, like Taft,2 ' viewed the Sherman Act as codifying
the pre-existent common law. 22 Yet, on the other hand, he sustained Peckham's earlier opinions which had as one of their
pillars the view that the Sherman Act did not incorporate the
common law. Indeed, Peckham believed the Sherman Act to be
something new under the sun, and he contradicted White's
affirmance of a relationship between the common law and the
statute.23 White glossed over these thorny problems, and by
using "reason" in its generic sense, he purportedly discovered the
unifying thread tying the Rate Bureau opinions to his own.
The underlying rationale of the per se rule is not clearly
articulated by White. He directs the legal adviser to consult
"the contracts and agreements, their necessary effect, and the
character of the parties by whom they were made." This formula
is replete with ambiguity and desperately needs clarification.
The Attorney General's Committee has found that United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co.24 better states and clarifies White's conclusive presumption rationale. 25 The two most usually quoted
sections which have been relied upon to demonstrate Justice
26
Stone's perspicacity follow:
[I] t does not follow that agreements to fix or maintain
prices are reasonable restraint and therefore permitted by
the statute, merely because the prices themselves are
reasonable. Reasonableness is not a concept of definite and
unchanging content. Its meaning necessarily varies in the
different fields of the law, because it is used as a convenient summary of the dominant considerations which
control in the application of legal doctrines. Our view of
20

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 65 (1911).

21 United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 278-80 (6th

Cir. 1898).
22 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). United States
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
23 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 334

(1897).

24273
25

U.S. 392 (1927).

Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-

trust laws, (1955) p .13.
26 Ibid.; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-398

(1927).
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what is a reasonable restraint of commerce is controlled
by the recognized purpose of the Sherman Law itself.
Whether this type of restraint is reasonable or not must
be judged in part at least, in the light of its effect on competition, for whatever difference of opinion there may be
among economists as to the social and economic desirability
of an unrestrained competitive system, it cannot be doubted
that the Sherman Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and
price control by the maintenance of competition...
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if
effective, is the elimination of one form of competition.
The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or
not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed
today may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established,
it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of
competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential
power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable
or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions.
Moreover, in the absence of express legislation requiring it,
we should hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of
business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as
whether prices are reasonable-a determination which can
be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our
economic organization and a choice between rival philosophies . . .
The first quoted section deals primarily with Mr. Justice
Stone's conception of reasonableness. For him and his majority,
reasonableness was a label which has for its function a necessarily
variant meaning- "it is used as a convenient summary of the
dominant considerations which control in the application of legal
doctrines." Reasonableness then, does not foreordain that a judge
must pass upon the level of prices or the proper functioning of

19581
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the economy. It directs attention to the underlying economic
structure. But since "reasonableness" functions as a label, it cannot be an inexorable guide leading to indisputable judgments
about proper economic structures. Its constituent elements may
highlight the factors which must be weighed and considered, but
the judge is left with the task of weighing these factors according
to some personal and inarticulated standard and may, quite plausibly, reach conclusions antithetical to the brilliant reason displayed by his colleagues. In short, reason is not, and by its nature,
cannot be an accurate, objective measuring rod. It remains a
label which usually conceals the actual judicial measuring rod
and masks policy decisions from the rake of public opinion.27
This is not to advocate that judges should now begin to evaluate
price levels or economic performance to see if they are reasonable
instead of toncentrating on economic structure, but it is to say
that if one consults solely the rule of reason he will add little
certitude to his arsenal of prognostication concerning future
judicial behavior. By itself, reason at the hands of the judges has
not demarcated explicitly the periphery between the rule of
reason approach and the per se approach to price fixing.
The second part of the quote from Trenton Potteries concerns itself with the per se rule but is equally ambiguous. A careful reading displays that the Court is talking about at least two
elements-purpose (intent) and economic power to carry out
that purpose. Nowhere in the opinion does the Court indicate
whether these factors are to be weighted equally or in some nonequal ratio-and how or why? Furthermore, it is impossible to
tell whether the Court is condemning the existence of power
wrongly used or the use of an illegal device to create market
power which might be lawful but for the creating device (bordering on Alcoa's theory). Other confusion is illustrated when
Stone uses the weasel word "involves"-"involves the power to fix
prices... involves the power to control the market." What does
this mean? Does price fixing create market power or precede it?
Trenton Potteries,as a case interpretation, leans heavily on a
"power" interpretation of the per se doctrine although the intent
27

On this general point see Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decises" 14 A.B.A.

Jour. 71, 159 (1928).

Emphasis on "anti-competitiveness" may or may not be

more helpful than a "restraint" criteria depending upon the way in which it is used.
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element is also ubiquitously present." It must be remembered
that the defendants controlled eighty-two percent of the pottery
bathroom fixtures produced in the United States. And it is unknown to what extent this fact may have colored the Court's opinion, but the case was appealed from a charge to the jury which
contained heavy power overtones. The defendants believed the
charge that "an agreement on the part of the members of a combination controlling a substantial part of an industry, upon the
prices which the members are to charge, is in itself an undue and
unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce''29 was funda-

mentally incorrect. Justice Stone upheld this jury charge and, in
essence, concluded that "a uniform price-fixing by those controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business, in interstate
commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite the reasonableness of the prices agreed upon." 30
That this formulation is a highly unsatisfactory standard for
future guidance can easily be demonstrated. Not only does the
opinion fail to describe the proper proportionate weights for
elements of intent and power which apparently have coalesced
in the per se application, but its discussion of the power element
is most vague. Evidently production of eighty-two percent of
vitreous pottery bathroom fixtures qualifies as "controlling in a
substantial manner"-but by what standard of substantiality?
Does vitreous pottery bathroom fixture production qualify as a
trade or business? Is it an industry? Apparently so, but again,
by what standard? A review of these factors indicates that the
per se approach of Trenton Potteries is no more definite nor
clear-cut indicator than are its considerations about the rule of
reason. In fact, its per se announcement emphasizing the power
approach, overflows with words like "substantial" and "reason",
which cannot be accurate measuring rods, but rather are labels
cloaking judicial policy decisions.
From Trenton Potteriesit is quite impossible to determine the
precise underlying rationale of the conclusive presumption operating in White's per se approach, for like the rule of reason,
2
8 For the same approach see also Standard Oil of Indiana v. United States,
283 U.S. 163 (1931).
29 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927).
SOld. at 398 (emphasis supplied). Of course this holding has the merit of
showing the irrelevancy of the level of prices fixed-if they were fixedl
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Trenton Potteries purports to measure intent and economic
power. The rule of reason considerations found in other cases
have advanced no precise or accurate gauge, and consequently,
the per se approach relying upon the power factor can have none.
But more importantly, the case does not delimit the boundaries
of per se application thereby carefully marking them off from the
domain of the rule of reason. Instead there is a jumbled confusion
of the same general factors. Yet in spite of all this, the Attorney
General's Committee thought Trenton Potteries to be a clear
statement of the underlying rationale of the per se doctrinel
Trenton Potterieswas decided in 1927 and a review of the role
of price fixing to that date shows no consistent legal approach.
So far as the pre-Sherman Act cases are concerned, price-fixing is
surrounded by a midst of confusion. Learned common law scholars have concluded both ways on its legality. An apt example can
be found by comparing two Circuit Court cases, five years apart,
both of which ultimately found their way to the Supreme Court:
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n.,31 and United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. 2 In Trans-Missouri, Circuit Court Judge Sanborn believed the common law did not
condemn price-fixing per se, but only if the arrangement proved
itself to be unreasonable. On the other hand, after reviewing
many of the same authorities, Judge Taft concluded that all
price-fixing arrangements were per se condemned and did "not
think that at common law there is any question of reasonableness
open to the courts with reference to such a contract."3 3 The
essential premise for Taft is that at common law, all non-ancillary

contracts were void, while the converse is true for Judge Sanborn.
The confusion of opinions has not been confined to the bench,
and other scholarly reviewers believe exclusively that "Taft's
scholarship remains unassailable." 34 But others are equally convinced that it is "plain that Taft was guilty of many errors and
omissions which led him into . . . an erroneous conclusion." 35
3158 Fed. 58 (8th Cir., 1893)- Reversed 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
3285 Fed. 271 (6th Gir., 1898 ; Affirmed 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
33

United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).

34 Handler,

"Judicial Architects of the Rule of Reason", 10 Am. Bar Ass'n.

Antitrust Section Report 21, 26 (1957); Oliphant, "Trade Associations and the
Law", 26 Cal. L. Rev. 381, 384 (1926).
35
Peppin, 'Price Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Antitrust Law",

28 Cal. L. Rev. 668, 688 (1940).
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Whether his scholarship was unassailable or not is now beside
the point for Taft's view of the common law has come to prevail. It has provided a foundation for other decisions which hold
price-fixing and other non-ancillary agreements unlawful per se
at the common law.36
Prior to Trenton Potteries the lower federal courts split over
whether or not price-fixing was per se illegal. Some lower courts
upheld pricing agreements for many reasons: because they felt the
agreements had an insignificant market effect;3 7 or because there
was a failure of proof showing an unreasonable effect would follow; 38 or because they relied on some basic legal tie between an
admittedly lawful power and a resale price system. 39 On the other
hand, other lower courts chose to deny legality, 40 and this was
41
probably the majority view.
The Supreme Court struck down all price-fixing agreements
which came before it during this time, but its exact reasoning
remains a mystery. 42 Like Trenton Potteries, the cases involved
a clear presence of market power which was capable of fixing
prices, and the economic effects of the arrangements could pretty
well be demonstrated-as well as a specific intent. The opinions
do not unequivocally show which element, or which combination of elements with their proper weights amounted to illegality;
even despite Justice Peckham's quite literal interpretation of the
Sherman Act which prevailed at this time.
It might be argued that the per se rule is inseparably bound
up within Peckham's Rate Bureau reasoning. Since Peckham did
place extreme reliance on the word "every", then the Supreme
36 Id. at 689, 690 see especially notes 246, 247. Milton Handler believes the
rule of Addyston Pipe consistently has been followed by the lower courts. See
T.N.E.C. Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, Monograph No.

38 p.3713. (1940).
United States v. Nelson, 52 Fed. 646 (D.C. Minn., 1892).
38 Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102 Fed. 594 (W.D. Wash., 1900).
39 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co. 149 Fed. 838 (C.C. Mass.,
1906); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed.
358 (7th Cir., 1907).
40 United States v. Hopkins, 82 Fed. 529 (C.C. Kan., 1897); United States
v. McAndrews and Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823 (S.D.N.Y., 1906).
41 See Comment, 19 U. of Chi. Law Rev. 837, 849 (1952); Peppin, "Price
Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Antitrust Law", 28 Cal. L. Rev. 297
(1940).
42 See United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n. 166 U.S. 290 (1897);
United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n. 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Addyston Pipe and
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Continental Wall Paper Co. v.
Voight and Sons, Inc., 212 U.S. 227 (1909).
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Court's position was simply that of condemning all price-fixing
arrangements without regard to market power. Intent or purpose
to fix prices plus some overt act would then conclusively constitute an antisocial conspiracy purportedly devoted to subverting
the competitive goal of society. Though this reasoning is supportable, 43 it must deal with Peckham's words in Trans-Missouriwhich
clearly contemplate a power approach of balancing the economic
factors. 44 Consequently, irrespective of the pleas made, it is impossible to deduce fromTrenton Potteries or the earlier cases any
clear and unequivocal line which separates a rule of reason approach from a per se approach; or even to ascertain what necessary combination of purpose and power blend together to destroy
a price fixing agreement per se illegal.
Price-fixing has been approached from the power-element side
of the rule of reason approach, and also from the vistas of the
purpose element. Courts have applied both the per se doctrine
and the rule of reason to price-fixing.
The rule of reason approach with its concomitant stress on
economic facts and their effects is embodied in Board of Trade of
Chicago v. United States4 5 and later expanded upon in Appalachian Coals.46 In Board of Trade Justice Brandeis upheld a rule of
the grain exchange which fixed prices at the closing bid of daily
sessions for grain "to arrive". Brandeis believed "the true test of
legality [to be] whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."4' 7 He
would apply this test to "every agreement concerning trade" 48
and directs attention to "the facts peculiar to the business to...
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable." 49
This case makes it amply clear that proof of purpose, power and
43See Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed.
271, 282 (6th Cir., 1898) where he thinks clear evidence of a general purpose
is sufficient
to violate the Act; See also Douglas' footnote 59 in Socony-Vacuum.
44
In Trans-Missouri, Peckham said, "In this light it is not material that the
price of an article may be lowered. It is the power of the combination to raise
it . . . Nor is it for the substantial interests of the country that any one commodity be within the sole power ... of one powerful combination of capital."
166 U.S. 290, 324 (1897). (emphasis supplied).
445246
6

U.S. 231 (1918).

Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 844 (1933).

471Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
48Ibid.

49bid.
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effect are all required before an agreement will fall as illegal.50
Board of Trade can be interpreted as supporting the view
that the proper approach to price-fixing is through the rule of
reason and that a price-setting agreement among parties without
economic power to affect the market cannot be price-fixing within
the per se rule. 1 Trenton Potteriesdistinguished Board of Trade
as affecting "only a small proportion of the commerce"'5 2 thereby
evidencing clearly that even the strict per se rule of Trenton Potteries contemplates a high concentration of market power.
Appalachian Coals can be fitted into this pattern by declaring its holding to be that where there is intent without power to
fix prices there can be no price-fixing within the per se rule.
The Court thought good intentions alone would not be enough
to save a price-fixing scheme if dire economic consequences would
ensue,5 3 but that this "plan cannot be said to contemplate or
involve the fixing of market prices."'5 4
It is, of course, significant that the Court does not adopt this
view exclusively as its holding in Appalachian Coals but also
emphasizes purpose. When it was confronted with the case and a
similar situation, Justice Douglas in United States v. SaconyVacuum Oil Co.,55 thought that "in reality the only essential thing
in common between the instant case and the Appalachian Coals
case is the presence in each of so-called demoralizing or injurious
practices."5 6 He then distinguished the case and argued that it
is consistent with Trenton Potteries because "unlike the plan in
the instant case, the plan in the Appalachian Coals case was not
designed (intended?) to operate vis a vis the general consuming
5o But see, American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S.
877 (1921) where Justice Clark relaxes the evidentiary requirements. Yet United

States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 871 (1922) emphasized economic power,

and in Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 585 (1925)
Justice Stone distinguished Am. Column and Linseed from Maple Flooring and

the first Cement case on the basis of economic power and its antecedent consequences.
51 Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931)
and Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States 288 U. S. 344, 873 (1933) are
susceptible to the same general approach.
52 United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927).
53 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States 288 U.S. 344, 372 (1933).
54 I.at
378 (emphasis supplied). See, Report of the Attorney General's
National CommiAttee (1955) p. 23.
55 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
561Id.

at 216.
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market and to fix the prices on that market." 57 So the Appalachian
Coals plan is distinguished because, (inferred by the Court, of
course) its parties had only regional intent instead of general
consuming market intent Does this shed light on the per se
sphere and offer a usable guide to its perimeters? Douglas also
lays emphasis on economics and the fact that the Appalachian
Coals plan had not been put into effect-the effect "of that plan
on prices was not only wholly incidental but also highly conjectural."58
By operating at a high level of generalization, it is, of course,
easy for Justice Douglas to argue that Appalachian Coals, Board
of Trade. Trenton Potteries and Socony Vacuum all fall into a
unified pattern. They do. They all deal with the general elements of purpose and power. But he ducks the hard questions,
i e., what difference, if any, is there between a rule of reason approach and a per se approach-how ascertained and why? It may
very well be that the rule of reason approach may not differ from
the per se approach at all. But before deciding the matter, a
brief view of some of the strict per se cases involving the other
major element-intent or purpose is in order.
Some fandmark cases have emphasized intent as the controlling element in a per se application. Indeed, if the per se doctrine is to differ siguificantly from the rule of reason, it must
refrain from an economic examination of the facts for if per se
violations are "clearly a restraint of trade within the purview of
the statute, they could not be taken out of that category by indulging in general reasoning . . ."59 With economic scrutiny

foreclosed, intent or purpose is the only other alternative open.
An early foundation for the per se approach based on intent
was laid in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons.60 Decided
on demurrer, it has been heralded 6' as holding resale-price con57 Ibid. (emphasis supplied). Justice Black does not ascribe such importance

to intent in a per se case. "The effect, and if it were material, the purpose of
the combination charged was to fix prices." United States v. Frankfort Distilleries
324 U.S. 293, 297 (1945).
5s8
Ibid.

59 Chief Justice White in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
65 (1911).
60 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
61 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee (1955) p. 14; Com-

ment 58 Yale L. J. 1121, 1127 (1949).
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tracts unlawful per se because they have "for their sole purpose
the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, [which]
are injurious to the public interest and void. ' 62 This is the holding approved of by the Attorney General's Committee. 63 Not only
is the statement questionable as to the correct holding of the
case, but it highlights the element of intent, i. e., the purpose of
Hughes' finding early in the opinion that Dr. Miles Co.'s system
of interlocking restrictions "obviously restrained trade" and eliminated all competition. Consequently, it cannot be argued that,
solely on the basis of Dr. Miles, a showing of economic effect or
power is not necessary-granted, however, that Hughes never
overtly engaged in the metaphysics of market delimitation and
product inclusion or exclusion. The reverse could not plausibly
be considered either, but it is certainly conceivable that the true,
exact holding had nothing to do with the Sherman Act.
The case arose on a demurrer to the complaint which alleged
that the defendant had committed an actionable wrong by inducing Dr. Miles' agents to sell to him thereby breaching their
contracts. Hughes found that the case could not properly be regarded as one for inducing breach of trust by an agent under the
theory of the complaint, because any agent of Dr. Miles Co.
(wholesale or retail) legitimately could have sold to defendant's
vendor thereby breaking the chain which was required to link
the defendant to plaintiff, Dr. Miles Co.6 4 Necessarily, the demurrer was upheld and all of the language concerning the Sherman Act can be characterized as pure dictum.
As precedent for a per se illegality approach to price-fixing,
the case is quite vulnerable to distinction on several other grounds.
Being decided before Standard Oil but during the same term, it
came without benefit of White's Standard Oil opinion, and in
addition, Dr. Miles involved a "secret process" which can be
analogized to a lawful patent monopoly when considering the
requisite amount of market power. More importantly, Hughes
treated Dr. Miles Co., a manufacturer, as a representative of a
62220 U.S. 373, 408-409 (1911). (emphasis supplied). See'also United
States63v. U. S. Steel for a discussion of the requisite intent to violate the Act.
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee (1955) p. 15.
64 Id. at 398.
65 Id. at 408-409.
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combination of dealers 65 when he said that "the advantages of
established retail prices primarily concern the dealers. ' 66
In any event, no conclusive evidence can be gleaned from
Dr. Miles either on the boundary between per se and reasonableness or on the proper elements or their relative weights within the
per se doctrine itself. Although leaning heavily on intent, or
purpose, it can plausibly be argued that the Court's analysis in
Dr. Miles was predicated upon a view that Dr. Miles Co. held
significant market power and economic effect. 67 Thus the per se

approach in Dr. Miles does demand an appreciation of the economic effects of a price or production agreement 68 as well as a
thorough consideration of its purpose. That this is fundamentally
the same approach as the rule of reason needs no demonstration. 9
Trenton Potterieshas been discussed above, and Justice Douglas expanded and used it in Socony-Vacuum to state unequivocally that market power is not a required element of the per se
approach. In footnote 59 Douglas said, "that does not mean
that both a purpose and a power to fix prices are necessary for
the establishment of a conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. ' 70 A "conspiracy to fix prices violates Section 1 of the Act
though no overt act is shown, though it is not established that the
conspirators had the means available for the accomplishment of
their objective, and though the conspiracy embraced but a part
of the interstate or foreign commerce in the commodity." 71 If
this view is the law then Appalachian Coals and its companion
cases have been laid to rest. But is it the law?
The quoted language, although clear, is purely dictum and
66
Id.at 407.
67

F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing, 275 U.S. 441 (1922) adopted much of the
sweeping dicta of Dr. Miles, but is distinguishable as applying only to Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act and not to Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In
addition, the case recognizes the necessity of market power to enforce a resaleprice maintenance system. Id. at 445.
68 Though distinguishable, other cases involving resale price schemes clearly
rely on considerations of market power and economic effect. See, Straus v. Am.
Pub. Ass'n. 231 U.S. 222 (1913); United States v. Shrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S.
85 (1920); But cf., United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
69 We should have supposed that, if one thing were definitely settled, it
was that the Sherman Act forbade all agreements preventing competition in price
among a group of buyers, otherwise competitive, if they are numerous enough
to effect the market." Judge Hand in Live Poultry Dealers' Protective Ass'n. v.
United States, 4 F2d 840, 842 (C.A. 2d, 1924) (emphasis supplied).
70 United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 (1940).
71 Ibid.
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wholly unnecessary to the case decision. Proof of the effect on the
market had already been made, and indeed, it was acknowledged
as essential to establish jurisdiction.72 Furthermore, the instructions expressly required the jury to make a finding of the presence of economic power and its effect.7 3 Socony-Vacuum adds no
clear holding that power is not required in, a per se case, but does
spew the judicial landscape with dicta to that end. 4
Perhaps the highpoint to date, of an intent or purpose approach was reached in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram and Son 75
which possibly can be interpreted as condemning price-fixing
absent power or economic effect. This interpretation however,
fails to account for Justice Black's great reliance on the decision in
Socony-Vacuum. His terse worded opinion quotes approvingly
from that case for support of his position striking down the maximum resale-price maintenance scheme of Kiefer-Stewart-"Under
the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal
per se." 70 With heavy reliance on this passage from Socony-

Vacuum it cannot conclusively be argued that Kiefer-Stewart is a
square holding which differs from its predecessor per se cases, and
no longer requires scrutiny of economic power and its market
effects. The major premise is still lacking.
The overall current drift of the price-fixing cases from Dr.
Miles to last term's per curiam opinion in United Liquors Corp.
v. United States1 may very well be toward a position of prohibiting all price-fixing agreements regardless of their purposes, powers, or effects. If so, the Court should advance a dearly articulated and precise rationale which could be used as a guide to
its future decisions. However, Appalachian Coals and its sister
cases, have not been overruled expressly. Consequently, the
Court currently has two strings to its bow. If the Supreme Court
2Tbid.; See also 'F.The Spot Market Prices During the Buying Program."
Id. at 194-98.
78 Id. at 210-11.
74

Other similar dicta can be found in United States v. Masonite Corp., 816
U.S. 265, 276 (1942); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S.
293 (1945); United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-74
(1948).
75340 U.S. 211 (1951).
70340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
77352 U.S. 991 (1957).
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wishes to do so, it can approach a price-fixing agreement from
the viewpoint of Appalachian Coals-weigh the economic factors
in a rule of reason approach, and thereby mask its policy choice
under a label. On the other hand, the Court, once having decided
that a specific price or production scheme is undesirable, can
infer the requisite prohibited intent or purpose and then syllogistically conclude against the scheme from the dictum basis of
Socony-Vacuum, Dr. Miles, etc. One cannot predict, solely from
the decided cases at least, which way the Court will land, and a
study of independent judicial philosophies could help prognosticate the direction of the leap.
Both a power or economic effect approach to price-fixing and
a purpose or intent approach can be found in the cases. Currently
then, both elements must be considered and weighed, but no one
knows by what set of fractions. No clear boundary line can be
cleaved between a per se case and a rule of reason case. Looking
again to Chief Justice White it is consistent to conclude that
$'reason" is rampant in both kinds of cases and that the proposed
per se-reasonableness dichotomy is false.
White held no naive view about a per se approach. He upheld
Peckham's early opinions, but he was aware that a per se approach
could not operate itself without reason. He sustained the Rate
Bureau cases explicitly on the theory that they had incorporated
reason. And for him, like Stone, reason was no more than a functional label, i. e., a judgment resting upon a use of mental faculties which had for its basis a weighing of many factors not the
least of which were "the nature and character of the contract or
agreement."78 He vigorously maintained that the Rate Bureau
cases "cannot, by any possible conception, be treated as authorities without the certitude that reason was resorted to for the purpose of deciding them." 79 Consequently, in reality, White advanced one, and only one, approach for all Sherman Act cases.
It was, and still is, through reason, which for him could be the
only ultimate basis of what has come to be known as the per se
doctrine. "Reason" meant a considered judgment, or choice,
78s tandard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64-70 (1911).

79bid.; But see Id. at 68, where White, not wanting in frankness, says that
if the Rate Bureau cases should still be conceived as conflicting with his pro posed
construction of them and the statute then "they are necessarily now limited and
qualified."
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which discriminates among pertinent economic factors reflecting
a deliberation of their merits in the grand tradition known to the
common law. There was no room for a mechanistic per se jurisprudence clanking machine-like within White's rule of reason.
Indeed, the per se rule embodies the heart of reason and cannot
be distinguished from that quagmire of more general quicksand
where reason is given a wider ambit of freedom. There has been
advanced no exact standard which allows a judge to use a little
reason to decide a per se case, but prohibits him from using a
whole lot of it, commensurate to the requirements of a rule of
reason case. It is all bound up together and any attempted dichotomy is untrue.
Perhaps this false dichotomy arose from a belief that pricefixing inevitably and inexorably must lead to a restraint of trade.3 0
If believed, this economic theory could then become a basis for
declaring all price or production agreements void without an examination of economic power and its attendant effects. This
interpretation would, of course, ultimately delve into the highest
abstract realm of metaphysics and divorce itself from all economic reality because under it economic factors and their implications need not be proved nor argued. As economically implausible as it may be, this proposition seems to be the fundamental
assumption underlying Trenton Potteriesand ipso facto the other
cases which rely upon it (Socony-Vacuum, Kiefer-Stewart, etc.) .81
The false economic premise basic and inherent in Stone's
thought in Trenton Potteries is that every group which may engage in a pricing agreement has power to make that agreement
effective, i. e., control over the relevant market. But can it rationally be assumed that every group which may agree on a common
price has the requisite market power? s2 Furthermore, must every
price agreement have for its primary purpose the elimination of
all market competition? These premises are exactly the ones
which were called into question by the chain of cases highlighted
80 The author who coined the phrase "per se" maintains that it was intended
only to cover activities which were obviously restraints (without dissent?) and
that it was not intended to foreclose Board of Trade. See Whitney "Trial of An
Antitrust Case," 5 Record of N.Y. Bar 449, 454 (1950).
81 See Jaffe and Tobriner, "Legality of Price Fixing Agreements," 45 Harv.
L. Rev. 1164 (1932).
82At least one other court expressly has refused to make this assumption,
see State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R.I. 254, 70 Ad. 1 (1908).
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by Appalachian Coals. Yet, if all direct price-fixing is to be illegal
per se and at the same time, the Sherman Act is to reflect true
economic facts, then the fundamental premise of Trenton Potteries, and consequently the per se doctrine, is in hopeless contradiction with economic reality. The premise cannot endure scrutiny for it is clearly contrary to the obvious facts of economic life.
No single group of price fixers need necessarily have requisite
market power to control market price.
The cause of much of the confusion lies not with the rule
of reason or the per se doctrine at all, for they are labels only.
As has been shown, the per se doctrine relies upon reason with all
of its implications, for its sole existence and application.8 3 But
rather, the cause of much confusion lies in the specific economic
theory applied in these cases under various legal labels. No one,
economist, lawyer or otherwise, has yet propounded a comprehensive and thoroughly impeccable theory of competition, workable or otherwise, which takes account of man's activities in
the economic world as it is actually constructed. Instead, current
Sherman Act economic thinking stems from those economists
who profess to be price theoreticians, and they content themselves with a description of how markets ought to work if certain
assumptions (admittedly unreal) are given. Their theory of price
formation purports not to summarize how markets actually have
operated in the historical past nor how they will actually function in the immediate future. Their theory stems in the main,
from Ricardian premises which are analogous to and incorporate
Newtonian conceptions of natural mechanics. Since Ricardo, the
real insights of demand, interest rates, proportionality, levels of
employment etc., have gradually become embedded in a theory
of general equilibrium economics. The postulate of mechanism
has functioned to define relevancy and its attendant inclusion or
exclusion of relevant inquiry rather than the character and operation of the actual economic system from which the original insights were drawn. As a system of ideas price theory does not
direct attention to, nor give coherent nor systematic guidance to
83

Witness the great length and extent of the reasoning to which Douglas
goes in Socony-Vacuum to show that there was an obvious undue limitation on
competition and also a per se violation which, purportedly, does not call into
play the reasoning inherent in the rule of reason approach!
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distinctions between public and private, nor an evaluating criteria
of alternative economic systems, nor shed light on economic
structure. It neglects these considerations precisely because it is
the private, individual, net income position of "firms" which is
the cortex for its various systems of equilibria. Policy measures are,
therefore, external to the system, and are looked upon as interferences. Price theory focuses upon the construction of the "market" as the tool of economic organization and guidance. It simply
is not a true fact of life that scarce resources are allocated among
alternative uses exclusively and solely by the market.8 4 The real
determinant of allocation is the organizational structure of a society, and at the very most, the market only gives effect to prevailing institutions. The market is not the crucial factor. If
economic attention is directed only to the "market" and relevant problems are defined by it, then economists have ignored
the real allocation mechanism. Hence the hiatus between price
theory and the other social sciences. It is quite true, that price
theory is more developed, but in the wrong direction for it does
not ask the pertinent questions of structure. Yet some lawyers
and economists seek to build it into the Sherman Act which does
ask the very structural questions price theory is not prepared to
answer. In short, the traditional theory of price does not deal
with society as it is actually constituted and cannot be a realistic
guide. But rather, the economic model declares how markets
ought to work given a set of predispositional assumptions which
as yet, have not been articulately legislated into the Sherman Act.
To the extent this theory is judicially built into the Sherman Act
-through the rule of reason or the per se doctrine-then its subsequent interpretation becomes as unreal as the premise basic to
Trenton Potteries. So long as judicial decisions are captured by a
metaphorical model that postulates a perfect market in which all
participants, with perfect information in hand, act in a perfect
rational way to maximize their economic gains, the Sherman Act
will be governed by fiction and not fact. Many economists defend this fiction and its affiliated folklore as though they were
the facts of life, but to make a true contribution they must develop
84See Ayer's discussion of Boulding, "A New Look at Institutionalism" 47
Am. Ec. Rev. Papers and Proceedings 1, 26 (1957); Gambs, Beyond Supply and

Demand (1946).
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ways of dealing with the behavior of men as well that of markets.8 5
Until social scientists give judges a clearer explanation of
institutional structure operating within our actual economy, its
manifestly complicated workings, and its future trends, inaccurate policy decisions will continue to lurk inarticulately behind the
labels of the Sherman Act. The rule of reason and the per se approach both are convenient labels which can be used to justify
progress or regression. There is no clear immutable line dividing
the concepitons and both ultimately rest on a reasoned judgment
emanating from the judicial mind. The broad generalization of
Justice Jackson in InternationalSalt that "it is unreasonable per
se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial*market"8s8 cannot be relied upon as a precise guide to future judicial behavior.
Neither can the economists perfectly competitive model nor
Morganstern's theory of games predict our way. The per se rule
still embodies reason despite the Department of Justice's quite
understandable press for its elimination and expulsion. But
until a more realistically accurate and comprehensive theory of
political economy is formulated and subsequently built into the
Sherman Act, the shibboleth of a per se allegation will not and
should not deter judicial examination of the institutional economic background of the challenged economic activities s7 Reluctantly or not, judges will continue to determine whether defendants actually have the economic power to impose undue restraints as charged, and whether they are exercising or intending
to exercise that power to the injury of other competitors. Blackstone's syntactics have not yet triumphed over Korzybskian semantics in Sherman Act matters. The wise practitioner is well
counseled to continue to marshall all economic evidence available
and be prepared to advance it no matter whether the complaint
reads "per se" or "rule of reason."
85
Lerenr and Lasswell, The Policy Sciences pp. 16, 302-303 (1951); But
see Peterson, "Antitrust and the Classical Model," 47 Am. Ec. Rev. 60 (1957).
86
832 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
8T

See Robinson, Downie and Montrose, "How Should We Control Mo-

nopoly?" 46 Economic journal 567 (1956); Strackey, Contemporary Capitalism

(1957).

KENTUCKY
Vol. 47

LAW JOURNAL
Fall, 1958

Number 1

EDITORIAL BOARD
1958-1959
H. WENDELL CimmRY

Editor-in-Chief

B. INABN
Associate Editor

LiNzA

FRED F. BRADLEY

RICHARD D. CooPER

Note Editor

ARTUR L. BRooKS, JR.

E. ADA_ s
CHmALES E. Goss

Comment Editors

RoBER

JAMES H. ByDwEL.
NELSON

E.

SA&ER

T. P. LEwrs
Faculty Editor

FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW
ex officio
(MRS.)

MARTA GALLAGHm,

Secretary

The Kentucky Law Journal is published in Fall, Winter, Spring and Summer
by the College of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. It is entered
as second-class matter October 12, 1927, at the post office, at Lexington, Kentucky,
under the act of March 3, 1879.
Communications of either an editorial or a business nature should be addressed to Kentucky Law Journal, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
The purpose of the Kentucky Law Journalis to publish contributions of interest and value to the legal profession, but the views expressed in such contributions
do not necessarily represent those of the Journal.
The Journal is a charter member of the Southern Law Review conference.
Subscription price: $4.00 per year
$2.00 per number

